

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

Estate of BLAIR AUSTIN NELSON,  
deceased, by and through PAUL  
NELSON individually and as  
Personal Representative,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHELAN COUNTY, Washington, a  
municipal corporation; d/b/a  
CHELAN COUNTY REGIONAL  
JUSTICE CENTER; CHRISTOPHER  
SHARP; and KAMI ALDRICH,  
L.P.N.,

Defendants.

NO. 2:22-CV-0308-TOR

ORDER GRANTING IN PART  
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO  
STRIKE AND DENYING  
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR  
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BEFORE THE COURT are Defendants' Motion to Strike (ECF No. 32) and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15). The Court has reviewed the record and files herein, determined that oral argument is unnecessary in this matter, and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants'

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AND  
DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 1

1 Motion to Strike (ECF No. 32) is GRANTED in part and Defendants' Motion for  
2 Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15) is DENIED,

3 **BACKGROUND**

4 This matter arises out of the medical treatment of Ms. Blair Nelson, a 42-  
5 year-old woman who was in the custody of the Chelan County Regional Justice  
6 Center ("CCRJC") when she died on November 21, 2021. ECF No. 26 at 8. The  
7 Wenatchee Police Department arrested Ms. Nelson on November 20, 2021, for  
8 suspicion of Driving Under the Influence. ECF No. 16 at 3. At the time of her  
9 arrest, Ms. Nelson agreed to submit to a portable breath test, which recorded a  
10 reading of 0.256 blood alcohol level. *Id.* at 4. She was then taken to the CCRJC  
11 for DUI processing, but because the breath samples taken upon her arrival recorded  
12 above 0.250, per jail policy, she was transported to Central Washington Hospital to  
13 be medically cleared before booking. *Id.* During her emergency room visit, Ms.  
14 Nelson indicated that while she was not in any pain, she was routinely drinking 70  
15 shots of liquor per week. *Id.* at 5. She was treated by Dr. John Crane for a  
16 contusion above her eye, and after submitting a breathalyzer test with a 0.249  
17 result, was medically cleared for jail. *Id.* at 6. Upon her discharge, she was sent  
18 with instructions for the onset for withdrawal symptoms, which included, "[c]all  
19 your doctor now or seek immediate medical care if: You have trembling,  
20 restlessness, sweating, and other withdrawal symptoms that are new or that get

1 worse.” ECF No. 26 at 3.

2 Relevant for the facts of the matter moving forward, CCRJC relies on a  
3 combination of Lexipol Policies, which are a national set of policies for corrections  
4 practice, to provide a framework for operation. ECF No. 19 at 3. The pertinent  
5 provisions at issue here are Lexipol Policy 711 and Policy 717. The Court does  
6 not have before it a formal copy of Lexipol Policy 711, and instead must rely on  
7 parties’ retelling of the contents, which the Court understands to mean that  
8 individuals who are brought to the facility in need of emergency medical attention  
9 are required to be taken promptly to a medical facility. ECF No. 19-1 at 23. It  
10 appears that was accomplished, as Ms. Nelson was taken to a hospital prior to  
11 booking.

12 Lexipol Policy 717 deals with detoxification and withdrawal. Policy 717.1  
13 states that “newly incarcerated individuals may enter the facility while under the  
14 influence of a substance or they may develop symptoms of alcohol or drug  
15 withdrawal. This policy is intended to ensure that the staff is able to recognize the  
16 symptoms of intoxication and withdrawal from alcohol or drugs” for appropriate  
17 medical treatment. ECF No. 30-10 at 2. Policy 717.2 requires that staff “respond  
18 promptly to medical symptoms presented by inmates” because withdrawal can be  
19 life-threatening. *Id.* And Policy 717.5 requires that:

20 Inmates who are observed experiencing severe, life-threatening  
intoxication (overdose) or withdrawal symptoms will be promptly seen

1 by a physician or referred to an off-site emergency facility for treatment  
2 . . . If the qualified health care professional determines that an inmate  
3 is at risk for progression to a more severe level of withdrawal, the  
4 inmate will be appropriately housed in an area where he/she can be kept  
5 under constant observation by qualified health care professionals or  
6 trained correctional staff.

7 *Id.* at 3.

8 Additionally, CCRJC has its own internal policy regarding withdrawal  
9 which states, among other things, that an assessment for withdrawal should be  
10 conducted “when an inmate reports a history of alcohol and/or withdrawal or is  
11 identified by staff as having potential for alcohol withdrawal if known history or  
12 alcohol use . . . or if the inmate has a high index of suspicion for potential  
13 withdrawal.” ECF 30-16 at 8. After withdrawal treatment has begun, inmates will  
14 be “monitored in medical observation by staff until stable and cleared by medical  
15 staff.” *Id.*

16 After being medically cleared by the hospital, Ms. Nelson was then  
17 transported back to CCRJC in the early hours of November 21, 2021 and filled out  
18 a Medical Screening Form upon her arrival. ECF No. 16 at 6–7. Because of the  
19 early hour, she was observed by Corrections Deputy Christopher Norse rather than  
20 a medical professional at her initial medical intake.<sup>1</sup> *Id.* at 8. Ms. Nelson told

---

<sup>1</sup> CCRJC does not have a 24-hour medical staff, instead the on-site nurses begin  
work sometime around 6 a.m. ECF No. 26 at 10. CCRJC instead relies on non-

1 Deputy Norse that she would be “detoxing from alcohol,” and Deputy Norse  
2 checked a box stating that Ms. Nelson appeared “under the influence of alcohol,”  
3 and made a note that she would be withdrawing from alcohol on the Medical  
4 Receiving Screening Form. ECF No. 26 at 10. All other boxes on the form were  
5 checked “no,” and Deputy Norse noted that Ms. Nelson was not currently  
6 displaying withdrawal symptoms. ECF No. 16 at 7. Deputy Norse then provided  
7 Ms. Nelson with a pitcher of Gatorade, and placed her in a holding cell at 3:14 a.m.  
8 *Id.* at 7–8. He then deposited all of Ms. Nelson’s screening paperwork in a box for  
9 medical staff to review when they arrived for their shift. *Id.* at 8. There is no  
10 surveillance video of her time in the holding cell. ECF No. 26 at 10.

11 Ms. Nelson was moved from the holding cell to a private cell at 6:25 a.m.  
12 *Id.* From this point onward, parties generally disagree on many of the material  
13 facts. Defendants assert that Ms. Nelson was properly monitored by correction  
14 staff between 7:45 a.m. and 11:38 a.m., as evidenced by the surveillance footage of  
15 her cell. *Id.* During that time, according to Defendants, Ms. Nelson was altogether  
16 peaceful, sleeping comfortably and showing no sign of agitation. *Id.* at 9. Plaintiff  
17 asserts that because no check was performed on Ms. Nelson, despite the presence  
18 \_\_\_\_\_  
19 medical staff to do after hour intake and requires that they be trained via Lexipol  
20 Policy 711 and Lexipol Policy 717.

1 of medical staff during this time, there is no way to substantiate the statement that  
2 she was not distressed based on surveillance footage. ECF No. 26 at 3. Further,  
3 while Defendants state that Ms. Nelson used the phone and walked without trouble  
4 during this time, Plaintiff asserts that she did have difficulty and agitation using the  
5 telephone in her cell and was having difficulty reaching anyone on the other end.  
6 ECF Nos. 16 at 8 and 26 at 3.

7 At approximately 12:15 p.m., two corrections deputies entered Ms. Nelson's  
8 cell to distribute her lunch. ECF No. 16 at 9. Ms. Nelson was unable to stand to  
9 retrieve her sack lunch and had visible tremors. ECF No. 26 at 11. Because she  
10 "was not doing well," and the correction officers suspected alcohol withdrawal,  
11 they alerted LPN Kami Aldrich, a member of CCRJC's medical staff. *Id.* LNP  
12 Aldrich examined Ms. Nelson at 12:25 p.m., and based on her agitation, anxiety,  
13 nausea, and "severe tremors," gave her a Clinical Institute Withdrawal Assessment  
14 ("CIWA") score of 10 or 11. ECF Nos. 16 at 11 and 26 at 13. The parties disagree  
15 as to whether LPN Aldrich meant to categorize the tremors as "severe," but  
16 Plaintiff offers that the shaking was so apparent that LPN Aldrich was unable to  
17 take Ms. Nelson's blood pressure and persisted even when the arms were relaxed  
18 rather than raised. ECF Nos. 16 at 11, ¶ 47 and 26 at 12, ¶¶ 21–22. Based on the  
19 CIWA assessed score of at least 10, CCRJC's internal policy either permitted or  
20 required LNP Aldrich to take certain action, including administering Tylenol,

1 Librium, thiamine, and folic acid.<sup>2</sup> ECF Nos. 16 at 11, ¶¶ 45–46 and 26 at 13, ¶  
2 25. Plaintiff asserts that LPN Aldrich did not contact a medical provider as is  
3 required by the internal policy, and likewise administered a “loading dose” of 100  
4 milligrams of Librium, twice the permitted amount. ECF No. 26 at 13, ¶¶ 26, 28.  
5 Defendants dispute this contention, asserting that LPN Aldrich did in fact contact a  
6 medical provider, though Plaintiff disputes this fact as no documentation exists  
7 showing contact with a provider. ECF No. 28 at 7. Librium is a narcotic and can  
8 result in oversedation which in turn may compromise respiration due to its  
9 interaction with the liver. ECF No. 26 at 13, ¶¶ 29–30. According to Plaintiff,  
10 LPN Aldrich had to steady Ms. Nelson’s hands to administer the medications due  
11 to her shaking. *Id.* at 14, ¶ 32.

---

12  
13 <sup>2</sup> CCRJC’s internal policy requires that after a CIWA is completed, inmates shall  
14 be subject to monitoring by medical staff until cleared. ECF No. 30-16. Provision  
15 two of the Alcohol Withdrawal Policy states that Thiamine, Folic Acid, and  
16 Tylenol “may be initiated,” for inmates with a potential for or active withdrawal.  
17 *Id.* However, provision three has no modifier, and instead simply states “[f]or a  
18 CIWA score of [greater than] 8 start Librium and contact provider.” *Id.* Medical  
19 staff is permitted to dose 50 milligrams of Librium every 6–12 hours on the first  
20 day. *Id.*

1 LPN Aldrich left Ms. Nelson's cell at 12:29 p.m. ECF No. 26 at 12, ¶ 19.  
2 Defendants assert that Ms. Nelson made two phone calls outside of her cell, and  
3 returned at 12:44 p.m., appearing without any major withdrawal symptoms. ECF  
4 No. 16 at 12, ¶¶ 49–50. After interacting with a corrections officer, who stated that  
5 she "appeared fine," Ms. Nelson laid down in her bunk, and was observed reaching  
6 for what appeared to be a tissue that she placed in her mouth at 12:45 p.m. *Id.* at  
7 13, ¶ 53.

8 Both parties agree at 12:58 p.m., Ms. Nelson experienced a noticeable  
9 movement. ECF Nos. 16 at 13, ¶ 54 and 26 at 15, ¶ 36. Defendants insist that Ms.  
10 Nelson's movement was comprised of four separate myoclonic movements,  
11 indicating cardiac arrest, rather than a tonic-clonic seizure as demonstrated in  
12 alcohol withdrawal. ECF No. 16 at 13–14, ¶¶ 54–55. Plaintiff maintains that Ms.  
13 Nelson experienced a seizure. ECF No. 26 at 15, ¶ 36. Both parties agree that  
14 there was no more movement from Ms. Nelson until she was found dead in her cell  
15 at 5:17 p.m. ECF Nos. 16 at 14, ¶ 56 and 26 at 16, ¶ 41. Plaintiff asserts that in  
16 the hours between 12:58 p.m. and 5:17 p.m., Ms. Nelson was not placed on  
17 medical monitoring, per jail protocol, received no additional assessment for  
18 medical staff, and received inadequate check-ins from non-medical jail staff, thus  
19 no one was alerted to the fact that she was in distress. ECF No. 26 at 15–16, ¶¶  
20 39–40. Further, according to Plaintiff, LPN Aldrich falsified Ms. Nelson's medical



1 documentation, recording that 50 milligrams of Librium was administered between  
2 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., and that another 50-milligram dose was given between 1 p.m.  
3 and 3 p.m., rather than one “loading dose” around 12:25 p.m. *Id.* at 14, ¶ 34.  
4 Defendants assert that adequate check-ins were performed, and at all times Ms.  
5 Nelson was monitored by video surveillance. ECF No. 15 at 6.

6 Jail staff was unable to wake Ms. Nelson for dinner at 5:17 p.m. ECF No. 16  
7 at 14, ¶ 56. Resuscitation of Ms. Nelson was called off at 5:28 when she was  
8 pronounced dead. ECF No. 17 at 9. Rigor mortis had set in. ECF No. 26 at 16, ¶  
9 41. An autopsy was performed, and parties disagree as to its specific findings.  
10 The autopsy report states that the cause of death is “chronic ethanolism with  
11 steatohepatitis, dilated cardiomyopathy, and probable withdrawal.” ECF No. 20-5  
12 at 1. At her deposition, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy stated  
13 that in her opinion, the ultimate cause of death was chronic alcoholism. ECF No.  
14 30-8 at 4. When asked, the medical examiner discussed the possibility that Ms.  
15 Nelson’s death could have been caused by alcohol withdrawal, fatty liver  
16 (steatohepatitis), or dilated cardiomyopathy individually, or in some combination,  
17 as each is a symptom of chronic ethanolism. ECF No. 20-4 at 23.

18 Plaintiff brought this lawsuit on behalf of Ms. Nelson’s estate, claiming  
19 negligence and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Chelan County Jail Director  
20 Christopher Sharp, LPN Kami Aldrich, and Chelan County under a *Monell* theory

1 of liability. Defendants brought a Motion for Summary Judgment and  
2 subsequently a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's expert witnesses attached to the  
3 Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 15 and 32.

## 4 **DISCUSSION**

### 5 **I. Motion to Strike**

6 Defendants request the Court strike the testimony given from three of  
7 Plaintiffs' expert witnesses: Dr. Richard Cummins, Dr. Lori Roscoe (PhD), and  
8 Catherine Fontenot, prior to considering the Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF  
9 No. 33 at 2. Expert testimony is admissible if it meets the standards set forth in  
10 Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides:

11 A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,  
12 training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise  
13 if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge  
14 will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a  
15 fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c)  
16 the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d)  
17 the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts  
18 of the case.

19 Fed. R. Evid. 702.

20 In addition to specific issues with each expert, Defendants take umbrage  
with all three witnesses' reference to the September 7, 2021, death of Joseph A.  
Verville. ECF No. 33 at 4, 6, 7. Mr. Verville was booked into CCRJC on  
September 5, 2021, with noted signs of opioid withdrawal. ECF No. 1 at 18; ECF

1 No. 21 at 10, ¶ 41. LPN Aldrich first assessed him for withdrawal and gave detox  
2 medications at dinner the following evening, September 6. *Id.* Surveillance  
3 footage showed Mr. Verville vomiting at least six times after taking the withdrawal  
4 medication, but he was not assessed again by medical staff until he was found dead  
5 at 8:50 a.m. on September 7. *Id.* at 8; ECF No. 26 at 17. After his death, LPN  
6 Aldrich was notified of potential discipline on September 27, 2021, and was given  
7 a verbal warning on November 23, 2021, after the death of Ms. Nelson. *Id.* at 19.  
8 Defendants object to the expert testimony inclusion of Mr. Verville’s death as  
9 impermissible character evidence. ECF No. 33 at 5. Plaintiff asserts that each of  
10 the expert witnesses can discuss the death of Mr. Verville because it establishes a  
11 notice of a pattern of conduct by CCRJC, Director Sharp, and LPN Aldrich. ECF  
12 No. 42 at 4.

13 On summary judgment, “[a] party may object that the material cited to  
14 support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in  
15 evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The Court must only consider admissible  
16 evidence. *Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA*, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).  
17 “A district court’s rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony ... will be  
18 reversed only if ‘manifestly erroneous.’” *United States v. Cazares*, 788 F.3d 956,  
19 976 (9th Cir. 2015). In considering whether expert testimony is based on a  
20 sufficient foundation, the Court performs a “gate-keeping” role by evaluating the

1 relevance and reliability of all expert testimony, and examining whether the  
2 testimony offered is “scientific.” *Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael*, 526 U.S.  
3 137, 147 (1999). While “[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces  
4 an ultimate issue,” Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a), “an expert witness cannot  
5 give an opinion as to her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of  
6 law.” *United States v. Diaz*, 876 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 2017).

7 In *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the  
8 Supreme Court identified four non-exclusive factors that may be helpful to the  
9 court in assessing the relevance and reliability of expert testimony, including (1)  
10 whether a theory or technique has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique  
11 has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential error  
12 rate and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the theory or  
13 technique's operation; and (4) the extent to which a known technique or theory has  
14 gained general acceptance within a relevant scientific community. *Id.* at 593–94.

15 However, the *Daubert* factors do not constitute a “definitive checklist or  
16 test.” *Id.* at 150. Indeed, the court's fundamental objective is to generally evaluate,  
17 based on whatever factors are important to the particular case, the relevancy and  
18 reliability of the testimony and not necessarily to explore factors that might not be  
19 relevant to a particular case, such as whether the expert’s methods are subject to  
20 empirical testing. *Id.* at 151. The proponent has the burden of establishing that the

1 pertinent admissibility requirements have been met by a preponderance of the  
2 evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 104.

3 **A. Dr. Richard Cummins**

4 Dr. Cummins is a Washington State licensed medical doctor who is board  
5 certified in both internal medicine and emergency medicine. ECF No. 27 at 6. Dr.  
6 Cummins has been a member of the University of Washington Department of  
7 Internal Medicine and Emergency Medicine since 1981, when he became an  
8 attending physician. *Id.* He was promoted to full professorship in 1985 where he  
9 remained for 28 years until retiring from clinical work in July 2020 to Professor  
10 Emeritus. *Id.* During his tenure at the University of Washington Medical Center,  
11 he practiced and taught other physicians in the field of emergency medicine, as  
12 well as supervised nurses, medical students, and residents in training. *Id.* Over the  
13 course of his career, Dr. Cummins has authored more than 150 articles and book  
14 chapters on emergency care, including cardiac care. *Id.*

15 Dr. Cummins reviewed the entire case file, including medical reports, video  
16 footage, discovery related documents, and deposition transcripts. ECF No. 27 at 8.  
17 In doing so, he determined that CCRJC has a substandard training program and  
18 procedures in place which led to; failure to medically assess Ms. Nelson when she  
19 was booked into jail, failure to follow the internal alcohol withdrawal policy, and  
20 failure to provide a proper level of assessment, monitoring, and care. *Id.* at 15. Dr.

1 Cummins determined that had CCRJC rectified any of the failures in care, Ms.  
2 Nelson would not have died. *Id.*

3 Defendants assert that Dr. Cummins is not qualified to give expert testimony  
4 on the operations of medical procedures inside a corrections facility because his  
5 experience is with emergency departments in hospitals. ECF No. 33 at 3–4.

6 Defendants also object to Dr. Cummins statements on the basis that he is offering  
7 impermissible character evidence in his discussion of LPN Aldrich’s conformity  
8 with past negligence, which is inadmissible character evidence. *Id.* at 4. Finally,

9 Defendants argue that Dr. Cummins should not be able to opine on causation

10 relating to the practice of jail staff and the death of Ms. Nelson. *Id.* Plaintiff

11 asserts, in part, that Dr. Cummins is not offering opinions about the correction

12 facility’s practices, but whether or not a standard of medical care was met while

13 Ms. Nelson was incarcerated, and therefore is within his sphere of expertise. ECF

14 No. 42 at 7. As to impermissible character evidence, Plaintiff offers that Dr.

15 Cummins’ opinion is valid under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) as evidence

16 of a notice, pattern of conduct, knowledge, or absence of mistake. *Id.* at 17.

17 Further, Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Cummins is allowed to opine on the ultimate issue

18 of causation per Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) and provides testimony in the

19 same scope as Defendants’ experts.

20 First, the Court finds that Dr. Cummins is qualified to give an expert opinion

1 on medical care, given his “knowledge, skill, experience, [and] education[.]”  
2 *Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co.*, 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1153 (E.D. Wash. 2009).  
3 Despite the fact that Nelson’s death took place in a corrections facility rather than a  
4 hospital, Dr. Cummins has extensive knowledge of treating patients in various  
5 stages of medical stability, including alcohol withdrawal, given his career in the  
6 emergency department. *United States v. Garcia*, 7 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1993)  
7 (finding that an expert’s experience in a field but lacks particularized knowledge in  
8 the specific facts of a case, goes to the weight of the testimony rather than the  
9 admissibility of the expert opinion). He is qualified to discuss how and when  
10 medication should be administered, and allowed to give his opinion about the  
11 initial medical intake and ongoing monitoring of inmates who are under the care of  
12 jail medical staff. *Edmo v. Corizon, Inc.*, 935 F.3d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 2019)  
13 (internal citations omitted) (“Accepted standards of care and practice within the  
14 medical community are highly relevant in determining what care is medically  
15 acceptable and unacceptable.”). While Dr. Cummins is not necessarily familiar  
16 with medical practices in a correctional facility, he is familiar with the standard  
17 practice regarding medical care for individuals receiving treatment for alcohol  
18 withdrawal.

19 As an expert witness, Dr. Cummins is permitted to testify on causation.  
20 *Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC*, 858 F.3d 1227, 1237–38 (9th Cir. 2017) (“That

1 defendants may be able to offer other equally qualified medical opinion opposing  
2 causation also does not support the idea that *Daubert* should bar the admission of  
3 the testimony of the doctors offered as experts by Plaintiffs. Instead, the testimony  
4 of [both expert doctors] should have been admitted as expert testimony under  
5 Federal Rules of Evidence 702.”). Based on his own medical background and  
6 review of the record, Dr. Cummins’s opinion on the ultimate issue, that Ms.  
7 Nelson’s death was caused by failure in treatment for alcohol withdrawal  
8 syndrome, is permissible.

9       Next, Defendants assert that Dr. Cummins’ testimony amounts to  
10 impermissible character evidence, based on his comparison of the facts at hand  
11 with the death of Mr. Verville. ECF No. 33 at 4. Specifically, Defendants assert  
12 that Dr. Cummins’ report draws a comparison between Nurse Aldrich’s treatment  
13 of Ms. Nelson and the treatment of Mr. Verville, improperly concluding that Nurse  
14 Aldrich has a propensity to behave in a medically negligent manner. *Id.* at 5.  
15 Plaintiff asserts that a comparison is not offered in violation of Federal Rule of  
16 Evidence 404(b), but instead is offered to show a pattern of administering lower  
17 than the established standard of care to inmates, or lack of knowledge or mistake  
18 that a particular mode of operation would result in the death of an inmate under the  
19 care of CCRJC. ECF No. 42 at 17–18.

20       In relevant part, Rule 404(b) provides that, “[e]vidence of any other crime,



1 wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that  
2 on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Dr.  
3 Cummins’ report references the Verville incident twice, and not in great detail.  
4 ECF No. 27 at 8 and 12. The second reference in the report does seem to suggest  
5 that a connection is being drawn between the incident involving Nelson and the  
6 incident involving Mr. Verville:

7       Note that two months earlier 38-year-old Joseph A. Verville also died  
8       in custody at the Chelan County Regional Justice Center. Like Blair  
9       Nelson he was under the care of Kami Aldrich, LPN.

10 ECF No. 27 at 12.

11       While this evidence could be construed as character evidence suggesting that  
12 jail medical staff may have engaged in substandard care, the Court agrees that  
13 evidence of Mr. Verville’s death, and the circumstances surrounding it, are  
14 indicative of lack of mistake or absence of notice. Regardless, under Federal Rule  
15 of Evidence 703, a court is vested with the discretion to allow otherwise  
16 inadmissible facts or data if the “probative value in helping the jury evaluate the  
17 opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”

18       Here, CCRJC’s internal policy requires a specific assessment and  
19 monitoring framework for inmates withdrawing from alcohol dependence and  
20 opioid dependence. ECF Nos. 30-10 at 2 and 30-16 at 8. Though not completely  
analogous, the inclusion of the similar circumstances surrounding Mr. Verville’s

1 death may be indicative of absence of mistake or lack of accident via  
2 noncompliance with the internal protocol, which would result in the death of an  
3 unmonitored detoxing inmate. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). The Lexipol policy lists  
4 alcohol withdrawal and drug detox under the same heading, requiring an inmate  
5 experiencing either to be under “constant observation.” ECF No. 30-10 at 3.  
6 Because Dr. Cummins is an expert being offered to opine on the standard of  
7 medical care provided by CCRJC and the potential cause of Ms. Nelson’s death,  
8 the Court declines to strike his expert testimony as it does not amount to  
9 impermissible character evidence.

10 **B. Dr. Lori Roscoe, PhD**

11 Dr. Roscoe is a Certified Correctional Health Professional and a Certified  
12 Correctional Health Professional – Registered Nurse. ECF No. 28 at 4. Dr.  
13 Roscoe holds a bachelor’s degree in education, a bachelor’s degree in nursing, a  
14 master’s degree in public administration with a healthcare concentration, a  
15 master’s degree in nursing, a Doctorate Degree in Healthcare Administration, and a  
16 Doctor of Nursing Practice degree. *Id.* She began work in correctional healthcare  
17 in 1995 and today is the principal of Correctional HealthCare Consultants LLC and  
18 The Correctional Nurse LLC. *Id.* Dr. Roscoe holds an active registered nurse  
19 license in the states of Florida, California, Washington, and Georgia, and is  
20 licensed as a nurse practitioner in Florida, California, Virginia, Georgia, and

1 Kentucky. *Id.* Over the course of her nearly 30-year career, Dr. Roscoe has  
2 worked in a variety of correctional center settings relating to healthcare. *Id.*

3 Dr. Roscoe reviewed much of the information currently in the record,  
4 including the Chelan County Coroner Report, medical documents, the Complaint,  
5 discovery related information, and depositions. ECF No. 28 at 5–6. Based on this  
6 review, she determined that Ms. Nelson received substandard nursing care. *Id.* at  
7 11–12. As part of her finding, she determined that LPN Aldrich’s administration  
8 of 100 milligrams of Librium without consulting a provider was illegal but opines  
9 no further on this statement except to state that it deviates from the scope of  
10 practice of a licensed practical nurse. *Id.* at 9–10. She also included Mr. Verville’s  
11 death in determining that CCRJC has a substandard practice of care based on its  
12 failure to take corrective action after Mr. Verville’s death. *Id.* at 11.

13 Defendants assert that Dr. Roscoe’s testimony that LPN Aldrich “illegally”  
14 administered Librium without contacting a medical provider should be disregarded  
15 pursuant to Rule 401 and 403. ECF No. 33 at 6. Further, Defendants allege that  
16 her discussion of Mr. Verville amounts to character evidence and is therefore  
17 inadmissible. *Id.* Plaintiff argues that Dr. Roscoe’s discussion of Mr. Verville’s  
18 death is admissible for many of the same reasons as discussed under Dr. Cummins,  
19 and that her characterization of the Librium dose as “illegal” is factual and should  
20 therefore be permitted. ECF No. 42 at 21–22.

1 As an expert on nursing practice, Dr. Roscoe is permitted to opine on  
2 whether the standard of care administered from a nursing perspective. Much like  
3 Dr. Cummins, the Court finds that her discussion on the treatment received by Mr.  
4 Verville is relevant to Plaintiff's argument that CCRJC's medical care of inmates  
5 is substandard. Fed. R. Evid. 704(a).

6 As to her statement that LPN Aldrich's administration of Librium was  
7 illegal, Plaintiff offers additional support that any nurse would understand that they  
8 are not permitted to administer the narcotic without first contacting a provider.  
9 ECF No. 28 at 9–10 (“When LPN Aldrich decided to administer 100 mg of  
10 Librium, double the protocol dose, without consulting a provider, she was acting  
11 far beyond her scope of practice as an LPN and illegally . . . The administration of  
12 100 mg of Librium at that time significantly deviated from the standard of nursing  
13 care and the decision by LPN Aldrich to do so greatly exceeded the scope of  
14 practice of a licensed practical nurse.”). Federal Rule of Evidence 401 states that  
15 evidence is relevant if, “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable  
16 than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in  
17 determining the action.” And Rule 403 states that a Court may exclude evidence if  
18 it presents the danger of, “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the  
19 jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  
20 While potentially dangerous, against the stated internal policy, and seemingly in a

1 general lexicon of knowledge that it should not be done, Plaintiff offers no  
2 additional information that administering Librium without first contacting a doctor  
3 is “illegal.” As such, the Court shall disregard the notion that LPN Aldrich’s  
4 conduct was “illegal” based on Dr. Roscoe’s testimony, because Plaintiff has  
5 provided no additional information to support this statement. However, the rest of  
6 her report is admissible.

7 **C. Catherine Fontenot**

8 Ms. Fontenot is the Director of the Reception and Diagnostic Unit for  
9 VitalCore Health Strategies and was retained for her expertise in correctional  
10 practice. ECF No. 29 at 5. Ms. Fontenot has had a lengthy career in the field of  
11 corrections. She obtained her Bachelor of Science in criminal justice in 1992 and  
12 has worked in a variety of correctional settings since that time. *Id.* at 4. Ms.  
13 Fontenot obtained her master’s degree in criminology from Grambling State  
14 University in 2006, and became an adjunct professor at various institutions,  
15 teaching courses covering Criminal Law, Criminalistics, Emergency Management,  
16 Criminology, Juvenile Justice, Corrections Process, Drugs and Substance Abuse,  
17 and the Death Penalty. *Id.* at 5. In her current role, Ms. Fontenot was hired to  
18 streamline the inmate intake process and to implement an evidence-based health  
19 and safety classification. *Id.*

20 In reaching her conclusion surrounding this case, Ms. Fontenot reviewed

1 much of the record, including the Complaint, medical records, discovery materials,  
2 and deposition transcripts. ECF No. 29 at 5–9. She ultimately determined that  
3 CCRJC was not proactive in rectifying standards of care that led to the death of  
4 Mr. Verville, and these gaps in care led to the death of Ms. Nelson. *Id.* at 29.

5 Defendants’ object to the inclusion of Ms. Fontenot’s testimony because it  
6 alleges her testimony is based on medical information, impermissible under  
7 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 based on her background. ECF No. 33 at 7. They  
8 also allege that the language used, and the conclusions drawn run afoul of the  
9 character evidence requirement under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and 402. *Id.*  
10 Instead, Defendants urge that the Court look to a report prepared by its expert on  
11 correctional facility practice, Penny Bartley, which refutes much of the contents of  
12 Ms. Fontenot’s report. ECF No. 19-1 at 28–37. Plaintiff contends that Ms.  
13 Fontenot’s testimony is not being offered for a medical purpose, but instead is  
14 offered to demonstrate best corrections practices against the opinion of  
15 Defendants’ expert witness. ECF No. 42 at 22. Plaintiff also rejects the  
16 characterization of Ms. Fontenot’s report as containing “personal attacks.” *Id.* at  
17 23.

18 First, the Court determines that Ms. Fontenot is permitted to provide expert  
19 testimony in the field of correctional practices per Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  
20 Not only has she provided similar expert testimony in other legal matters, but her

1 education, experience, and training in the field, including her extensive background  
2 in both academia and in a correction setting, provides a foundation for her  
3 perspective on what constitutes safe and effective jail practices. ECF No. 29 at 4–  
4 5. As demonstrated both by Defendants’ own expert witness and additional filings,  
5 many times jail officials without a formal medical background must nevertheless  
6 be able to render rudimentary care, including identifying withdrawal symptoms,  
7 and continued monitoring of inmates. ECF Nos. 19 at 5, 19-1 at 19–20, 23, 24.  
8 The facts of this case demonstrate that in a jail system, staff must work together to  
9 keep everyone safe, inmates and each other alike, and as such non-medical staff is  
10 asked to do initial medical intake of inmates after hours and provide ongoing  
11 monitoring to recognize withdrawal and alert medical staff. *Id.*; ECF No. 29 at 13.  
12 In this spirit, the Court determines that no part of Ms. Fontenot’s opinion runs  
13 afoul of Rule 702. She does not make a medical diagnosis of withdrawal beyond  
14 the scope of what would have been asked of officials without a medical  
15 background working in the jail and recognizes the difference between medical and  
16 non-medical staff. ECF No. 29 at 15.

17 Further, while the language used by Ms. Fontenot is passionate at times, it is  
18 not excludable under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Many of the facts discussed  
19 by all of Plaintiff’s expert witnesses are disputed by Defendants’ expert witnesses.  
20 The solution to this predicament is not to strike the expert testimony, but rather it

1 should be subjected to “vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary  
2 evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof” for a jury determination.  
3 *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 596.

4 With the exception of Dr. Roscoe’s reference to the administration of Librium  
5 being “illegal,” Defendants motion to strike is denied.

## 6 **II. Motion for Summary Judgment**

7 Defendants move for summary judgment because they allege that Plaintiff  
8 will be unable to satisfy the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, both Director Sharp  
9 and LPN Aldrich are entitled to qualified immunity, and that the County cannot be  
10 held liable under a *Monell* theory of liability given the facts of this case. ECF No.  
11 15 at 5, 11, 14, 15.

12 Summary judgment may be granted to a moving party who demonstrates  
13 “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled  
14 to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the  
15 initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.  
16 *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the  
17 non-moving party to identify specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of  
18 material fact. *See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).  
19 “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position  
20 will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the [trier-of-fact] could



1 reasonably find for the plaintiff.” *Id.* at 252.

2 For purposes of summary judgment, a fact is “material” if it might affect the  
3 outcome of the suit under the governing law. *Id.* at 248. A dispute concerning any  
4 such fact is “genuine” only where the evidence is such that the trier-of-fact could  
5 find in favor of the non-moving party. *Id.* “[A] party opposing a properly  
6 supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or  
7 denials of his pleading but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a  
8 genuine issue for trial.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also First Nat’l*  
9 *Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.*, 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968) (holding that a party  
10 is only entitled to proceed to trial if it presents sufficient, probative evidence  
11 supporting the claimed factual dispute, rather than resting on mere allegations). In  
12 ruling upon a summary judgment motion, a court must construe the facts, as well  
13 as all rational inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving  
14 party, *Scott v. Harris*, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007), and only evidence which would  
15 be admissible at trial may be considered, *Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA*, 285 F.3d  
16 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).

17 **A. Section 1983 Claims Against Individual Defendants**

18 Defendants assert that summary judgment is warranted with respect to LPN  
19 Aldrich because she behaved objectively reasonably and provided adequate  
20 medical treatment of Ms. Nelson. ECF No. 15 at 14. Further, they argue that both

1 LPN Aldrich and Director Sharp should be entitled to qualified immunity. *Id.* at  
2 13.

3 To make a claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must show that (1) a person acting  
4 under color of state law (2) committed an act that deprived the plaintiff of some  
5 right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United  
6 States. *Leer v. Murphy*, 844 F.2d 628, 632–33 (9th Cir. 1988). Pretrial detainees  
7 have a constitutional right to adequate medical care while in the custody of the  
8 government and awaiting trial. *Russell v. Lumitap*, 31 F.4th 729, 738 (9th Cir.  
9 2022). When a violation implicates a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment  
10 right to adequate medical care, the Ninth Circuit requires the claim to be evaluated  
11 under an objective deliberate indifference standard. *Castro v. Cnty. of Los*  
12 *Angeles*, 833 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016). In the context of the Fourteenth  
13 Amendment, a plaintiff making a claim for inadequate medical treatment via  
14 failure to protect must show “more than negligence but less than subjective  
15 intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” *Id.* at 1071 (citing *Kingsley v.*  
16 *Hendrickson*, 576 U.S. 389 (2015)). The elements required to show violation of a  
17 pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights by failure-to-protect  
18 against individual officers include:

19 (1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the  
20 conditions under which the plaintiff was confined;

(2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering

1 serious harm;

2 (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate  
3 that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would  
4 have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the  
consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and

5 (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's  
injuries.

6 *Id.*

7 The third element regarding whether the defendant's actions were  
8 objectively unreasonable is an inquiry that will “turn on the ‘facts and  
9 circumstances of each particular case.’” *Kingsley*, 576 U.S. at 397 (internal  
10 citation omitted).

11 However, qualified immunity shields government actors from civil damages  
12 unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights  
13 of which a reasonable person would have known.” *Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S.  
14 223, 231 (2009). On summary judgment, a court examines whether a state official  
15 is entitled to qualified immunity by determining (1) whether the evidence viewed  
16 in the light most favorable to the plaintiff is sufficient to show a violation of a  
17 constitutional right and (2) whether that right was “clearly established at the time  
18 of the violation.” *Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria*, 915 F.3d 592, 599 (9th  
19 Cir. 2019).

1           *1. LPN Aldrich*

2           With respect to the § 1983 claim against LPN Aldrich, Defendants assert  
3 that all the care Ms. Nelson received was objectively reasonable, especially in light  
4 of her discharge from the Central Washington Hospital and subsequent appearance  
5 at CCRJC without apparent withdrawal symptoms. ECF No. 15 at 5–6. Further,  
6 according to Defendants, LPN Aldrich followed proper CIWA protocol and  
7 administered an appropriate standard of care, including providing a “loading dose”  
8 of Librium, and simply made a mistake diagnosing the tremors experienced by Ms.  
9 Nelson as “severe.” The reasonableness of LPN Aldrich was assessed by  
10 Defendants’ expert witnesses, Dr. Jared Strote and Nurse Billye Tollackson, in  
11 their review of the surveillance footage and related material. *Id.* at 7–8.

12           Plaintiff asserts that LPN Aldrich’s failure to assess Ms. Nelson until her  
13 tremors were “severe,” general failure to follow CCRJC’s withdrawal protocol,  
14 and failure to provide medical monitoring after administering medication, all  
15 amount to inadequate medical treatment. ECF No. 25 at 6–7. When viewed in the  
16 light most favorable to Plaintiff, reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not  
17 LPN Aldrich acted with reckless disregard in her treatment of Ms. Nelson.

18           As to the four factor tests detailed in *Castro v. County of Los Angeles* for  
19 determining a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, LPN Aldrich made several  
20 decisions with respect to Ms. Nelson’s care while confined, including choosing to

1 see her six hours after beginning her shift or while performing “med pass” at 9:30  
2 a.m., dosing 100-milligrams of Librium, and then failing to provide medical  
3 monitoring. ECF No. 26 at 11, 13, 14.

4 Second, reasonable minds could differ, evidenced by dueling expert  
5 witnesses, as to whether this conduct put Ms. Nelson at risk of medical  
6 complications. Nurse Roscoe, expert witness for Plaintiff, maintains that LPN  
7 Aldrich fell below the requisite standard of care at several points, including failing  
8 to visit Ms. Nelson’s cell after reviewing her intake paperwork, failing to  
9 accurately document her treatment of Ms. Nelson, and failing to provide  
10 appropriate medical monitoring given the CIWA policy. ECF No. 28 at 8–11. In  
11 contrast, Nurse Billye Tollackson, expert witness for Defendants, provided  
12 testimony that based on Ms. Nelson’s presentation without withdrawal symptoms  
13 at the time of her intake after discharge from the hospital, LPN Aldrich saw her at  
14 an appropriate time. ECF No. 21 at 4, 6. LPN Aldrich administered the  
15 appropriate medication per jail protocol, and Ms. Nelson did not appear on video  
16 surveillance to be in distress after care was given. *Id.* at 7–8.

17 As to the third element, whether LPN Aldrich’s actions were reasonable  
18 with respect to the care provided, critical facts are still in dispute because it is not  
19 readily apparent that she followed internal CCRJC’s protocol. Such facts,  
20 discussed at length *supra*, include: whether LPN Aldrich was required to evaluate

1 Ms. Nelson when she arrived for her shift, whether she should have and did not  
2 call a provider to discuss her withdrawal symptoms, and whether Ms. Nelson was  
3 appropriately monitored after withdrawal protocol was initiated. This is weighed  
4 in light of the additional circumstances, including Ms. Nelson's discharge from the  
5 Central Washington Hospital as fit for jail, the missing footage of her demeanor in  
6 the holding cell between the hours of 3 a.m. and 6:30 a.m. on November 21, 2021,  
7 Ms. Nelson's general state before, during, and after being treated for withdrawal,  
8 and LPN Aldrich's decision not to place Ms. Nelson on a heightened level of  
9 medical monitoring. ECF Nos. 16 at 6, 26 at 4; *compare* ECF Nos. 27 at 20, 28 at  
10 7, and 20-5 at 2 ("I placed a BP (Blood Pressure) wrist cuff around her wrist but  
11 due to the tremors it was unable to get [a] reading") *with* 17-1 at 4 and 21 at 6.

12 And the fourth factor, whether Defendant caused her injuries, is highly  
13 contested by both parties and is made no clearer by the autopsy report which listed  
14 the cause of death as "chronic ethanolism with steatohepatitis, dilated  
15 cardiomyopathy, and probable withdrawal." ECF No. 20-5 at 1. The medical  
16 examiner who performed the autopsy stated each symptom of chronic alcoholism  
17 could have independently or jointly have caused Ms. Nelson's death. ECF Nos.  
18 20-4 at 31-32 and 30-8 at 13-14. Plaintiff's medical expert, Dr Cummins, has  
19 testified that on a more probable than not basis, that Ms. Nelson's death was  
20 caused by the onset of alcohol withdrawal, and seems to suggest this could have

1 been further complicated by respiratory distress due to a negative interaction with  
2 the dose of Librium.<sup>3</sup> ECF No. 27 at 10, 18. Defendants' two expert witness reach  
3 separate conclusions from each other, and from Dr. Cummins. Dr. Jared Strote  
4 found on a more probable than not basis that Ms. Nelson's death was caused by  
5 cardiac arrest. ECF No. 17 at 8. And Dr. Carl Wigren found that Ms. Nelson's  
6 death was caused by hypoxia (a lack of oxygen to the brain) caused by heart  
7 contraction due to cardia arrhythmia which in turn was caused by either fatty liver  
8 disease or dilated cardiomyopathy. ECF Nos. 18 at 5, 18-1 at 7, and 38-8 at 10.

9 Nevertheless, Defendants assert that summary judgment is still proper  
10 because qualified immunity applies. At step one, the Court assesses whether or not  
11 there is a triable issue of fact as to whether a constitutional violation has been  
12 committed. *Hope v. Pelzer*, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). As discussed above, the  
13 Court determines that a jury may find that LPN Aldrich's medical care was  
14 inadequately performed with reckless disregard, because many of the key facts are  
15 still in dispute.

16 The second prong of the qualified immunity test is whether every reasonable  
17

---

18 <sup>3</sup> The Court once again notes that the autopsy did not reveal that Ms. Nelson died  
19 from a Librium overdose but did reveal a diseased liver as a side effect from  
20 overuse of alcohol. ECF No. 20-4 at 29.

1 official in the same position as the defendant would understand that the conduct  
2 was unlawful in the situation she was confronted with. *Taylor v. Barkes*, 575 U.S.  
3 822, 824 (2015) (per curiam) (holding that for qualified immunity purposes, law is  
4 “clearly established” if “every reasonable official would have understood that what  
5 he is doing violates th[e] right”); *Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego*, 985 F.3d 657,  
6 678 (9th Cir. 2021). Stated another way, a right is clearly established for qualified  
7 immunity purposes if “it would be clear to a reasonable [prison official] that [her]  
8 conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted’ ... or whether the state of the  
9 law [at the time of the alleged violation] gave ‘fair warning’ to [her] that [her]  
10 conduct was unconstitutional.” *Clement v. Gomez*, 298 F.3d 898, 906 (9th  
11 Cir.2002) (internal citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff must show that a reasonable  
12 nurse would have understood that failing to assess Ms. Nelson for potential  
13 withdrawal in a timely manner when medical shifts begin at 6 a.m., failing to  
14 properly assess and document her interaction with Ms. Nelson, failing to contact a  
15 provider based on withdrawal symptoms, and failing to provide substantive  
16 medical monitoring after providing withdrawal medication, “presented such a  
17 substantial risk of harm to [Ms. Nelson] that the failure to act was  
18 unconstitutional.” *Horton*, 915 F.3d at 600.

19 As a preliminary matter, pretrial detainees have a constitutional right to  
20 adequate medical care while in the custody of the government and awaiting trial.



1 *Russell v. Lumitap*, 31 F.4th 729, 738 (9th Cir. 2022); *Sandoval*, 985 F.3d at 667.  
2 The Ninth Circuit has held that prison officials violate the Constitution when they  
3 “deny, delay, or intentionally interfere” with medical treatment, *Jett v. Penner*, 439  
4 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006), or when the official’s chosen treatment is  
5 “medically unacceptable under the circumstances,” *Snow v. McDaniel*, 681 F.3d  
6 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Jackson v. McIntosh*, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.  
7 1996)). A lack of exact factual similarity is no bar to the establish that notice of a  
8 constitutional right exists in a given situation. *Wilk v. Neven*, 956 F.3d 1143, 1148  
9 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). However, “for a right to be clearly  
10 established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional  
11 question beyond debate.” *Kisela v. Hughes*, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per  
12 curiam) (internal citation omitted). Precedent in this area casts a wide net and  
13 includes instances of subpar medical attention which resulted in death, as well as  
14 instances involving treatment of less than life threatening ailments, as  
15 constitutionally deficient medical care. *See Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange*, 6 F.4th  
16 961, 970, 72 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding a pre-trial detainee has a right to medical  
17 screening and direct view safety checks); *Clement*, 298 F.3d at 905 (finding that  
18 denying inmates a shower and medical attention for four hours after being exposed  
19 to pepper spray while in confinement was clearly established as unconstitutional).

20 In viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, LPN Aldrich’s

1 care of Ms. Nelson could be described as both delayed and medically  
2 unacceptable, given the internal withdrawal policy of CCRJC that she purportedly  
3 did not follow. Plaintiff points to *Norman v. Wellpath, LLC*, No. 3:19-CV-02095-  
4 MO, 2022 WL 1516262, at \*13 (D. Or. May 13, 2022), a recently decided case  
5 from the District of Oregon, which is instructive but not binding. *Norman*  
6 involved a pre-trial detainee who died in custody from “complications of chronic  
7 beverage alcohol use.” *Id.* at \*2. Notable for the matter at hand, the deceased,  
8 who was discharged from a hospital, refused treatment after a medical evaluation  
9 from the nurse on duty. The nurse then contacted a doctor per jail protocol and  
10 received the instruction to “wait until morning” to assess her vital signs due to the  
11 amount of medication she had received at the hospital. The deceased was then  
12 placed on medical monitoring and received check-ins roughly every 45 minutes  
13 and was constantly monitored through a security camera. During the night, the  
14 deceased rolled off her bed, landing face down on the floor, and was found dead 20  
15 minutes later. *Id.*

16 While not entirely analogous because the nurses involved did not assert  
17 qualified immunity, *Norman* is helpful in its discussion of the right to direct-view  
18 safety check-ins recognized in *Gordon v. County of Orange*, 6 F.4th at 973. As  
19 applied to this case, the Court in *Gordon* stated:

20 Thus, at the time of the incident, Gordon had a clearly established  
constitutional right to have a proper medical screen conducted to ensure

1 the medically appropriate protocol was initiated. As applied here, [a  
2 nurse] acted as gatekeeper by serving as the screening nurse and was  
3 therefore responsible for identifying an inmate's urgent medical needs.  
Whether she failed to do so is properly considered under the first prong  
of the qualified immunity analysis.

4 *Id.* at 971–72.

5 Additionally, *Gordon* instructed that pre-trial detainees have a right to  
6 direct-view safety checks sufficient to determine whether their presentation  
7 indicates the need for medical treatment, and further held “law enforcement and  
8 prison personnel should heed this warning because the recognition of this  
9 constitutional right will protect future detainees.” 6 F.4th at 973. Further, the  
10 court in *Norman* found that “a reasonable jury could find that that [the nurse in  
11 question] violated [the deceased’s] rights by failing to put her on a closer watch.”  
12 No. 3:19-CV-02095-MO, 2022 WL 1516262, at \*17. While not exactly on point,  
13 the Court is satisfied based on the information as presented, that Ms. Nelson was  
14 entitled to be properly screened and watched while experiencing withdrawal and  
15 notice of this right was indicated on her intake form. ECF No. 20-3 at 1 (“Stated  
16 that she will withdrawal from alcohol”). A nurse in LPN Aldrich’s place would be  
17 on notice and understand that failure to administer proper care, akin to what is  
18 described in the internal CCRJC’s policy of monitoring, would result in the  
19 violation of a pre-trial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right, and ultimately lead  
20 to injury or death. Thus, she is not entitled to qualified immunity for summary

1 judgment purposes.

2 In sum, as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against LPN Aldrich, material facts are  
3 still in dispute and thus the Court cannot grant summary judgment. Nor does  
4 qualified immunity entitle her to summary judgment.

5 *2. Chelan County Jail Director Christopher Sharp*

6 Next, Defendants allege that Director Sharp either cannot be found liable  
7 under § 1983 or is entitled to qualified immunity because he had no interaction  
8 with Ms. Nelson while she was in the custody of CCRJC. ECF No. 15 at 13. In  
9 addition to a lack of direct involvement, Defendants also assert Plaintiff has failed  
10 to show that Director Sharp was deliberately indifferent via a failure to train  
11 theory, which provides that under § 1983, a supervisor can be held liable for a  
12 subordinate's violation if: “ ‘[his] own culpable action or inaction in the training,  
13 supervision, or control of his subordinates,’ ‘his acquiescence in the constitutional  
14 deprivations of which the complaint is made,’ or ‘conduct that showed a reckless  
15 or callous indifference to the rights of others.’” *Starr v. Baca*, 633 F.3d 1191,  
16 1195 (9th Cir.), *withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh'g en banc*, 652 F.3d  
17 1202 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Larez v. City of Los Angeles*, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th  
18 Cir.1991). Defendants assert that Director Sharp took meaningful steps after the  
19 death of Mr. Verville to provide an updated policy surrounding fentanyl  
20 withdrawal, including “jail checks,” and that LPN Aldrich behaved appropriately

1 in response to Ms. Nelson's symptoms. ECF No. 35 at 8. Plaintiff asserts that  
2 Director Sharp did not provide proper training and failed to meaningfully  
3 reprimand LPN Aldrich after the death of Mr. Verville. ECF No. 25 at 10.

4 Under § 1983, a supervisor cannot be held liable under *respondeat superior*.  
5 *Vazquez v. Cnty. of Kern*, 949 F.3d 1153, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020). Instead, a  
6 plaintiff's claim must show that a supervisor exercised deliberate indifference in  
7 the training or supervision of an employee, amounting to a constitutional violation.  
8 *Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles*, 758 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting *City*  
9 *of Canton, Ohio v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). As part of this  
10 demonstration, a plaintiff must show that the supervisor disregarded known gaps in  
11 a training program that would cause employees to violate constitutional rights, or  
12 the gaps must obviously lead to constitutional violations. *Connick v. Thompson*,  
13 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (internal citation omitted). Or, a supervisor may be held  
14 liable for the actions of an employee under § 1983 if he or she knew of the  
15 employee's violations and failed to act to prevent them. *Maxwell v. Cnty. of San*  
16 *Diego*, 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted). A plaintiff  
17 must show that the supervisor was deliberately indifferent to the need of employee  
18 training, and that the inaction of the supervisor was the moving force behind the  
19 constitutional violation. *See Flores*, 758 F.3d at 1159; *Oviatt By & Through*  
20 *Waugh v. Pearce*, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992).

1           The Court cannot determine that summary judgment is proper as to Director  
2 Sharp's failure to train LPN Aldrich. A supervisor may be held liable in an  
3 individual capacity for his "own culpable action or inaction in the training,  
4 supervision, or control of his subordinates." *Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal.*, 145  
5 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendants first argue that Director Sharp did not  
6 approve of any delay in medical care because LPN Aldrich responded  
7 appropriately to Ms. Nelson's symptoms. ECF No. 35 at 7. However, the internal  
8 policy states that inmates at risk of experiencing withdrawal shall be seen  
9 "promptly," and Ms. Nelson was not seen until almost six hours after LPN Aldrich  
10 began her shift, and then never reassessed again. ECF No. 30-10 at 3. And  
11 Plaintiff's contention that LPN Aldrich did not respond appropriately to Mr.  
12 Verville's detox but was still not instructed on internal CCRJC policies after his  
13 death, lends to argument that Director Sharp was aware of training flaws and chose  
14 inaction regarding inmates Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical  
15 treatment. ECF No. 25 at 10. And, though new policies were put in place,  
16 Plaintiff asserts that LPN Aldrich and the rest of the medical staff should have  
17 been retrained after the death of Mr. Verville, and LPN Aldrich stated she was not.  
18 ECF Nos. 25 at 19 and 30-15 at 17. There is no suggestion that members of  
19 medical staff were aware of the expectations under the new policies at the time of  
20 Ms. Nelson's death, or if the new policies addressed the cause of Mr. Verville's

1 death in custody. The Court agrees that reasonable minds could differ as to  
2 Director Sharp's knowledge of the need for retraining, and therefore declines to  
3 grant summary judgment.

4 Defendants contend that even if Director Sharp can be held liable under  
5 § 1983, he is nevertheless shielded by qualified immunity. ECF No. 33 at 7.  
6 Having already established that a triable issue of fact remains as to Director  
7 Sharp's supervisor liability under § 1983, the Court next considers the second  
8 prong of the qualified immunity test, whether the right "was clearly established at  
9 the time of the violation." *Sandoval*, 985 F.3d at 671. The Court concludes that,  
10 pursuant to the discussion surrounding LPN Aldrich *supra*, should a trier of fact  
11 determine that Director Sharp failed to provide adequate training and supervision  
12 to CCRJC medical staff, the right to adequate medical care via monitoring was  
13 established at the time of violation. *Gordon*, 6 F.4th at 970, 73. Therefore,  
14 Director Sharp is not entitled to qualified immunity at this time.

15 **B. Monell Liability Against Chelan County**

16 Finally, Plaintiff seeks to hold Chelan County liable under § 1983 for its  
17 ratification of a policy of failure to train staff to treat and monitor inmates for detox  
18 or withdrawal. ECF No. 25 at 17. Defendants argue that Chelan County had in  
19 place appropriate policies for addressing withdrawal and detox, and they were  
20 followed. ECF No. 15 at 15. Further, it asserts that the death of Mr. Verville

1 cannot be used to establish a pattern or practice for the purpose of *Monell* liability.  
2 *Id.* at 16; ECF No. 35 at 8.

3 A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983, except if a plaintiff can  
4 prove that it has a policy or custom which led to a constitutional violation. *Monell*  
5 *v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York*, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under a  
6 *Monell* framework, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) he or she had a constitutional  
7 right of which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy  
8 amounts to deliberate indifference to his constitutional right; and (4) “the policy is  
9 the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” *Dougherty v. City of*  
10 *Covina*, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011). There are three ways a plaintiff may  
11 satisfy the *Monell* policy requirement: first, a government may act pursuant to an  
12 expressly adopted policy, second a government may act pursuant to a  
13 “longstanding practice or custom,” *Thomas v. County of Riverside*, 763 F.3d 1167,  
14 1170 (9th Cir. 2014), and third, the person who commits the constitutional  
15 violation acts as a final governmental policymaker or such an official “ratified a  
16 subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” *Clouthier v.*  
17 *County of Contra Costa*, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff is  
18 arguing that Chelan County either has a practice of failing to train staff, or that it  
19 ratified constitutional violations of medical staff by failing to retrain and  
20 reprimand. ECF No. 25 at 16.



1 As to a standing policy or custom, Plaintiff argues that Chelan County  
2 offered no training to ensure that staff follow the internal policies of alcohol  
3 withdrawal and detox, including training regarding medical monitoring. *Id.* at 18–  
4 19. A failure to train may be the basis for *Monell* liability if it amounts to  
5 deliberate indifference. *City of Canton*, 489 U.S. at 388. To demonstrate a  
6 deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the choice was a conscious one  
7 in the decision not to train as it relates to the relevant constitutional violation,  
8 which can be satisfied by an obvious need for training that is lacking. *Price v.*  
9 *Sery*, 513 F.3d 962, 973 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[The failure to train standard is]  
10 objective in that it does permit a fact finder to infer ‘constructive’ notice of the risk  
11 where it was ‘obvious’—but this is another way of saying that there needs to be  
12 some evidence that tends to show a conscious choice.”). In general, a failure to  
13 train claim must contain; (1) the deprivation of a constitutional right, (2) a showing  
14 that the municipality had a training policy that amounts to deliberate indifference  
15 to the constitutional rights of those with whom officials are likely to come into  
16 contact; and (3) a showing that the constitutional injury would have been avoided  
17 had the municipality properly trained those officers. *Blankenhorn v. City of*  
18 *Orange*, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks  
19 omitted). However, the practice or custom must be founded upon sufficient  
20 frequency and consistency, isolated or sporadic incidents of violation are

1 insufficient. *Trevino v. Gates*, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations  
2 omitted).

3 Plaintiff posits that the County did not provide proper training to CCRJC  
4 staff on internal policies regarding withdrawal and detox, based on the failure of  
5 staff to respond appropriately to Ms. Nelson and Mr. Verville per those policies.  
6 ECF No. 25 at 18–19. This is further supported, according to Plaintiff, by a lack of  
7 proper protocol regarding video monitoring, evidenced by the fact that the only  
8 official policy describes video monitoring for the purpose of security and  
9 communication, but does not explicitly mention medical monitoring. *Id.*; ECF No.  
10 30-21 at 2. Defendants argue that Chelan County had in place proper Lexipol  
11 policies on withdrawal and detox, and that Plaintiff cannot show deliberate  
12 indifference based on a failure to train. ECF Nos. 15 at 12 and 35 at 9.

13 Having decided that the prior incident involving the death of Mr. Verville is  
14 admissible for purposes of demonstrating a practice or custom, the Court cannot  
15 determine that summary judgment is proper as to the *Monell* claim against Chelan  
16 County. For one, Defendants have produced no internal training or policy  
17 regarding video medical monitoring, despite stating that inmates with medical  
18 concerns are monitored this way. ECF No. 15 at 13. Further, there is no indication  
19 that there is a requirement that an CCRJC official in charge of the monitoring be  
20 medically trained, nor does it appear, based on Chelan County’s 30(b)(6)

1 deposition, that the monitoring is consistently done by the same person or  
2 particularly conducive for proactive monitoring. ECF No. 30-6 at 4–5 (“Basically  
3 I could be [in the control room] for five minutes while the individual goes to the  
4 bathroom. I could try to give them a 15-minute break occasionally.”) (“I can see  
5 movement, but if somebody is covered up, I cannot tell . . . if they’re just sleeping.  
6 I cannot tell how they’re doing specifically. The cameras are not that good as I  
7 cannot tell you . . . if she is breathing right now, I could not tell because she’s  
8 about right here.”). This is also set against the backdrop of Plaintiff’s contention  
9 that Mr. Verville vomited at least ten times while in custody, six of those times  
10 occurred after he was provided medication, yet was provided no additional  
11 assessment by medical staff. ECF No. 26 at 17. Further, Plaintiff and Defendants  
12 disagree about the effectiveness of video monitoring and the type of cell checks  
13 Ms. Nelson received after the administration of her withdrawal medication. ECF  
14 Nos. 15 at 6, 25 at 16, 19-1 at 7, and 30-13 at 4.

15 Defendants’ expert on correctional practices discussed that an internal  
16 investigation after the death of Ms. Nelson revealed that staff was confused about  
17 the internal policy regarding proper cell checks. ECF No. 19-1 at 27. And it  
18 appears that, even if the jail staff understood part of the internal cell check policy,  
19 that both deputies were to enter the cell, and perform a check at least every 60  
20 minutes, staff did not perform this function for either Mr. Verville or Ms. Nelson.

1 ECF Nos. 20-18 at 9–12 (describing how deputies “briefly looked” into Ms.  
2 Nelson’s cell, and LPN Aldrich did not visit during a 2:29 p.m. “Medical Pass”)  
3 and 30-20 at 6–9.

4 LPN Aldrich also failed to follow internal protocol with regard to Mr.  
5 Verville and Ms. Nelson. Plaintiff contends that internal jail protocol would have  
6 required both Mr. Verville and Ms. Nelson to be seen by medical staff “promptly”  
7 based on their respective reports that withdraw or detox may be a possibility but  
8 were not seen until their symptoms had become severe. Additionally, Plaintiff  
9 contends that both individuals should have been placed on heightened monitoring  
10 based on their condition, which was not done in either case. ECF No. 25 at 8.

11 The above-described conditions within CCRJC leave triable issues of fact  
12 for a jury to consider. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether Chelan County  
13 was deliberately indifferent to obvious gaps in training, as first demonstrated by  
14 the death of Mr. Verville, and ultimately led to violations of Ms. Nelson’s  
15 Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care. As such, summary  
16 judgment is not proper with respect to the *Monell* liability of Chelan County.

17 **C. Negligence Claim Against All Defendants**

18 Plaintiff argues that the same foundation that supports the constitutional  
19 claim brought against each defendant may also support a claim of negligence.

20 ECF No. 25 at 20. Defendants argue that there was no breach of duty, in that Ms.

1 Nelson at all times had access to adequate medical care, and that nothing CCRJC  
2 did or failed to do caused Ms. Nelson's death. ECF No. 15 at 16–17.

3 As is well known, the elements of negligence are duty, breach, causation,  
4 and damage or injury. *Hartley v. State*, 103 Wash. 2d 768, 777 (1985).  
5 Washington law requires that the breach be the proximate cause of the injury,  
6 meaning that it is both the cause in fact and the legal cause. *Id.* (internal citation  
7 omitted). “Breach and proximate cause are generally fact questions for the trier of  
8 fact. However, if reasonable minds could not differ, these factual questions may  
9 be determined as a matter of law.” *Hertog, ex rel. S.A.H. v. City of Seattle*, 138  
10 Wash. 2d 265, 275 (1999) (internal citation omitted).

11 Washington State law has long recognized the special relationship that exists  
12 between a jail exercising custodial control and a prisoner without liberty, and thus  
13 has imposed upon correctional facilities the requirement to keep a prisoner, “in  
14 health and free from harm.” *Gregoire v. City of Oak Harbor*, 170 Wash. 2d 628,  
15 635 (2010) (quoting *Kusah v. McCorkle*, 100 Wash. 318, 325 (1918)). Defendants  
16 do not contest that a duty exists to keep inmates safe while in custody but argue  
17 that there has been no breach of the duty, and that no action from the correctional  
18 facility caused Ms. Nelson's death. ECF No. 15 at 17–18.

19 The question of whether or not Defendants fell below the standard of care  
20 required of the duty imposed is at the heart of this matter, and greatly contested by

1 both sides. Plaintiff's expert witnesses are adamant that Defendants provided  
2 substandard care to Ms. Nelson while in custody. ECF Nos. 27 at 7, 28 at 12, and  
3 29 at 29. Defendants' witnesses are equally insistent she was given proper medical  
4 care. ECF No. 17-1 at 7, 19-1 at 6–7, 21 at 8. As such, reasonable minds could  
5 differ as the issue of breach.

6 Likewise, causation is fiercely debated by either side, and the crux of the  
7 ultimate question of liability. Cause in fact is the “but for” cause of the injury,  
8 meaning that the event would not have occurred without action from the defendant.  
9 *Taggart v. State*, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 226 (1992). Stated another way, cause in fact  
10 cannot be established if the plaintiff's injury would have occurred without a breach  
11 of duty. *Walker v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co.*, 65 Wash. App. 399, 403 (1992).  
12 However, there may be multiple “but for” causes or independent actors may breach  
13 separate duties which together produce an injury. *Meyers v. Ferndale Sch. Dist.*,  
14 12 Wash. App. 2d 254, 264–65 (2020), *aff'd but criticized*, 197 Wash. 2d 281, 481  
15 P.3d 1084 (2021). Legal causation, on the other hand, is a policy consideration  
16 intertwined with the question of duty and decides how far to extend defendant's  
17 responsibility for its actions. *Taggart*, 118 Wash. 2d at 226.

18 As was previously discussed, the medical examiner provided three separate  
19 symptoms of chronic alcoholism which could have independently or in some  
20 combination caused the death of Ms. Nelson, and is laid out *supra*, parties disagree

1 as to what specifically caused her death. ECF No. 20-5 at 1. Because reasonable  
2 minds could disagree as to the proximate cause of Ms. Nelson's death, whether it  
3 be a spontaneous medical episode or caused by some mistreatment of alcohol  
4 withdrawal, is ultimately a question for the jury.

5 Therefore, summary judgment as to the claim of negligence against all three  
6 defendants is denied.

7 **ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:**

- 8 1. Defendants' Motion to Strike (ECF No. 32) is **GRANTED in part**.  
9 2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15) is **DENIED**.

10 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and furnish copies to  
11 counsel.

12 DATED April 19, 2024.



15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Thomas O. Rice".

THOMAS O. RICE  
United States District Judge